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 Introduction 
Two centuries have passed since Selleck Osborn (1782-1826) first cautioned: ‘What you leave at your 
death, let it be without controversy; else the lawyers will be your heirs.’1 Despite the passage of 
time, the value of the warning remains unchanged. In Ireland, the relatively frequent reliance placed 
on the discretionary family provision scheme applied under the Succession Act 1965 by children 
seeking to contest a deceased parent’s will is generating ever increasing controversy.2 Pursuant to 
section 117, a child may apply to the court for ‘proper provision’ where a testate parent has, in the 
opinion of the court, failed in their moral duty to make such provision for them.3  
In 2013, cognisant of the debate surrounding various aspects of the scope and application of section 
117, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland committed to considering the section as part of its 
Fourth Programme of Law Reform.4 Honouring this commitment, and conscious of the changing 
demographic context in which the Succession Act is operating, the Commission recently addressed 
the issue of family provision under section 117 in its 2016 Issues Paper which is currently under 
consideration.5  
The Issues Paper highlighted five key areas for possible reform. For the purposes of this article, two 
issues appear to be of particular importance. First, the paper questioned whether section 117 of the 
Succession Act 1965 should be repealed, retained as it is or amended. In particular, if it is to be 
retained and amended, the Commission sought views on the factors, if any, to which the court 
should have regard in deciding whether to grant such an order and in determining the quantum of 
any order so granted.6 The Commission also questioned whether it would be appropriate to extend 
section 117 to facilitate claims by children of parents who die intestate.7  
                                                          
1
 Ronald Irving, The Law is a Ass: An illustrated anthology of legal quotations (New York: The Overlook Press, 
2011). 
2
 Although a relatively small number of cases make it to a final determination, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that many more such cases are settled short of trial. The pressure on an estate to settle, whatever the strength 
of the applicant’s case, is heightened given that costs are likely to be awarded to an unsuccessful litigant who 
challenges a will provided there was a reasonable ground for the litigation and it was conducted bona fide, see 
Elliot v Stamp [2008] IESC 10.  
3
 Section 110 of 1965 Act provides that any questions of deducing any relationship for the purposes of Part IX 
of the Act (which includes section 117), are to be determined by the Legitimacy Act 1931, and s 26 of the 
Adoption Act 1952, as those provisions apply in relation to succession on intestacy. Provision may therefore be 
made for children whether born inside or outside marriage and adopted children. 
4
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on the Fourth Programme of Law Reform (LRC 110-2013) p4.  
5
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Issues Paper: Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP9-2016).  
6
 Note, while the ‘Questions for consideration’ at p46 of the Issues Paper explicitly makes reference to the 
issue of quantum (‘the Commission…seeks views on the factors, if any, to which the courts should have regard 
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The engagement of the Law Reform Commission in undertaking this review and examining the 
entitlement of children under the 1965 Act is to be welcomed. This article, however, reserves 
judgment on the central questions concerning the potential restriction or extension of section 117. 
Instead, it reconsiders certain aspects of the Issues Paper from an entirely different perspective than 
that presented therein. Specifically, it highlights the potential implications of possible law reform in 
this area for the entitlements of surviving spouses – ripple effects which could easily be over-
looked.8  In the context of the review of the family provision scheme applied under section 117, this 
article moreover emphasises the need for the extension of such a regime, akin to that applied under 
section 117, to surviving spouses. In light of demographic trends towards an ageing society evident 
across the Western World, various law reform commissions including the Law Commission for 
England and Wales,9 the Scottish Law Commission,10 the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission11 and the British Columbia Law Institute12 have each investigated their succession law 
regimes with an explicit view to better ensuring the financial protection of surviving spouses. It is 
submitted that the current engagement of the Irish Law Reform Commission in re-visiting section 
117, presents a valuable opportunity in this jurisdiction to also undertake a review of the position of 
surviving spouses pursuant to the 1965 Act with a view to overcoming some of the weaknesses 
inherent in the regime. 
Part I briefly considers the entitlements of surviving spouses under the Succession Act 1965. Part II 
analyses the implications of possible reform of section 117 on these entitlements and, in particular, 
the implications for surviving spouses in a non-nuclear family context. Placing the financial 
protection of surviving spouses in Ireland in an international context, Part III of this article then 
presents an argument for, at a minimum, a legislative amendment to facilitate discretionary financial 
provision applications by surviving spouses. It argues that such reform responding to the potential 
financial vulnerability of such spouses is required to respond to the demographic exigencies noted 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in deciding whether to grant such an order and the amount so ordered’) (emphasis added), in the summary of 
the questions to be addressed in the following page, no reference to ‘amount’ or ‘quantum’ is included. 
7
 The three other areas of consideration concerned were: whether the 6 month time limit for applications 
under section 117 should be increased and/or whether the courts should have a discretion to extend it; 
whether the date from which the time limit in section 117 begins requires clarification or reform; and whether 
the personal representatives of the deceased parent should be under a duty to inform children of their 
entitlement to make an application under section 117. 
8
 The impact of section 117 orders on the entitlements of spouses and civil partners is only briefly touched on, 
see Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Issues Paper: Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP9-2016) 
p14. There is no discussion of how any reform extending section 117 to situations of intestacy would impact on 
surviving spouses. Note a full consideration of the entitlements afforded to civil partners under the Succession 
Act 1965 is outside the scope of this paper. In light of the recent introduction of the Marriage Act 2015 
facilitating same-sex marriage, it is likely many civil partners will wish to become spouses and thus avail of the 
entitlements of spouses pursuant to the 1965 Act. It is equally possible that civil partners who do not marry 
are doing so by choice and do not wish to be spouses, preferring a now lower level of commitment. In this 
context, the currently weaker protection afforded to civil partners under the 1965 Act may be more acceptable 
than was previously the case. A full consideration of the position of cohabitants is also outside the scope of 
this paper. 
9
 Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy and family provision claims on death (Law Com. No.331-
2011). 
10
 Scottish Law Commission, Report on succession (Scottish Law Com. No.215-2009). 
11
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: intestacy (Report No.116-2007). 
12
 British Columbia Law Institute, Wills, estates and succession: a modern legal framework (Report No.45-
2006). 
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by the Law Reform Commission in its latest publication13 and should be introduced as a matter of 
priority.  
 Part I: The entitlements of surviving spouses under the Succession Act 1965  
Pursuant to section 111 of the Succession Act 1965, a surviving spouse is entitled to a ‘legal right 
share’ on the testate death of their deceased spouse. If a deceased is survived by a spouse and no 
children, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate. If a deceased is survived by a 
spouse and children, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the estate. An order under 
section 117 in favour of an applicant child may not affect the surviving spouse’s legal right share, nor 
may it affect any devise or bequest to which the surviving spouse is entitled or any share to which 
they are entitled on intestacy. This protection is, however, subject to the condition that the surviving 
spouse is a parent of the applicant child.14 If the surviving spouse is a stepparent of the applicant 
child, although an order in favour of the child may reduce a gift or share on intestacy to which the 
stepparent is entitled, the surviving spouse’s legal right share remains untouchable.15  Regarding 
intestacy, section 67 of the Succession Act 1965 provides that where a deceased dies intestate and is 
survived by a spouse and no issue, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate. Alternatively, where 
a deceased dies intestate leaving a spouse and issue, the surviving spouse is entitled to two-thirds of 
the estate. The deceased’s issue share in the remaining one-third.16  
Unlike children, nowhere in the Succession Act 1965 do surviving spouses possess a general 
entitlement to seek further discretionary provision from the estate of their deceased spouse. The 
family provision scheme adopted pursuant to section 117 applies exclusively to claims made by 
applicant children. The only avenue for a surviving spouse to indirectly seek a greater share of the 
deceased’s estate arises under section 56. Pursuant to section 56, a surviving spouse may seek to 
appropriate a family home where the title to the property was held by the deceased. Where the 
share of the estate to which the surviving spouse is entitled is less than the value of the home they 
seek to appropriate, section 56(10)(b) provides that a surviving spouse may apply to the court to 
waive a payment of the difference due to the hardship which meeting the shortfall would cause.17 
Thus, in this manner, a spouse may benefit from a larger share of a deceased’s estate. However, the 
right to appropriate a family home and access discretionary provision under section 56(10)(b) is 
                                                          
13
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Issues Paper: Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP9-2016) pp9-
12. 
14
 Section 117(3) of the Succession Act 1965 provides that an order under section 117 ‘shall not affect the legal 
right of a surviving spouse or, if the surviving spouse is the mother or father of the child, any devise or bequest 
to the spouse or any share to which the spouse is entitled on intestacy’. 
15
 This would appear to be a reflection of what later became known as ‘conduit theory’, see below. See also L 
Waggoner, “The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code” 
(1990-1991) 76 Iowa Law Review 223.  
16
 Section 67(4). 
17
 Section 56(10)(b) provides ‘On any such application, the court may, if of opinion that, in the special 
circumstances of the case, hardship would otherwise be caused to the surviving spouse …order that 
appropriation to the spouse shall be made without the payment of money provided for in subsection (9) or 
subject to the payment of such amount as the court considers reasonable.’ Alternative remedies in this 
scenario are also set out by section 56. Section 56(9) provides that the surviving spouse may offset the 
difference in value by making a payment to the estate. Alternatively, section 56(3) provides that if there are 
infant children, defined as children under 21 years of age, who are entitled to a share in the deceased’s estate, 
and the surviving spouse is a trustee for them for such shares as they are entitled to, this may be added to the 
surviving spouse’s share on intestacy, legal right share or gift under the will in order to appropriate the home. 
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limited in a number of situations. Restriction apply in scenarios (a) where the dwelling forms part of 
a building, and an estate or interest in the whole building forms part of the estate; (b) where the 
dwelling is held with agricultural land an estate or interest in which forms part of the estate; (c) 
where the whole or a part of the dwelling was, at the time of the death, used as a hotel, guest house 
or boarding house; and (d) where a part of the dwelling was, at the time of the death, used for 
purposes other than domestic purposes. Section 56(5)(b) provides that the appropriation of such 
family homes may only take place where the court is satisfied that the appropriation is unlikely to 
diminish the value of the assets of the deceased, other than the dwelling, or to make it more difficult 
to dispose of them in the due course of administration.18 Furthermore, where there is no family 
home to appropriate, there is no legislative provision in the 1965 Act for a surviving spouse to seek a 
greater share of the deceased’s estate, nor is there in situations where the surviving spouse takes 
the family home under the right of survivorship. Surviving spouses in these situations have no 
mechanism by which to increase their share of the deceased’s estate, notwithstanding that they may 
be in considerable need.  
 Part II: Law Reform Commission Issues Paper and the implications for surviving spouses 
In its Issues Paper, the Commission provided a detailed overview of section 117 and the approach 
adopted in various jurisdictions to family provision claims made by children. In this context, as 
noted, the Commission sought responses as to whether section 117 should be repealed, retained as 
it is or amended. Furthermore, conscious of the support voiced in various quarters for the reform of 
section 117 to facilitate applications on intestacy – including its own recommendations on the issue 
almost 30 years ago – the Commission sought the views of the public on the appropriateness of such 
an amendment.19 In neither case, however, were the implications of such reform on the entitlement 
of surviving spouses afforded in depth consideration. 
Let us assume, therefore, that the lack of attention afforded to the implications of such reform on 
the entitlement of surviving spouses speaks to the Commission’s view that, if retained and amended, 
any reform of section 117 along the lines considered would be undertaken in the context of the 
current protections afforded to the entitlement of surviving spouse, where present.20 In practical 
terms, this would mean that where an order is made under any reformulated version of section 117 
on testacy, the entitlement of a spouse who is a parent of the applicant child – whether a legal right 
share, gift under a will or share on intestacy – would not be affected. By contrast, where a surviving 
spouse is not the parent of an applicant child, only their legal right share would be guaranteed.21 
Moreover, should section 117 be extended to cases of intestacy, while the share to which a surviving 
                                                          
18
 For more, see O’Sullivan, 'The Right to Appropriate the Family Home: A proposal for reform’ (2013) Dublin 
University Law Journal 36, 342-358. 
19
 See Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Issues Paper: Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP9-2016) 
pp 49-50. 
20
 Note, this is merely speculative. 
21
 See above. For this category of surviving spouse, any amendment or change in the interpretation of section 
117 as part of the current review is liable to have a significant effect. Insofar as the Law Reform Commission, 
on the basis of the various international examples presented in the Issues Paper, arguably appear to be leaning 
in favour of in some way re-clarifying the factors to be considered under section 117 with a view to perhaps 
restricting the likelihood of success of seemingly less meritorious claims, the entitlement of stepparents may 
benefit from better protection. 
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spouse who is a parent of the applicant child is entitled might be deemed untouchable,22 in 
replicating the current approach pursuant to section 117(3), the protection afforded to the 
entitlement of a surviving spouse who is a stepparent of the applicant child would appear much 
more vulnerable to attack. Although, at present, the share on intestacy of a surviving spouse who is 
not the parent of an applicant child may be reduced to zero, this is only available in the case of 
partial testacy where such spouses would, in any event, continue to be entitled to their legal right 
share. On this view, it might be considered that such minimum provision would continue to be made 
available where an order under section 117 would be made on intestacy with such spouses entitled 
to an untouchable share of one-third of the estate. 
The distinction between different categories of surviving spouses under the Succession Act 1965 has 
attracted minimal attention or comment to date. However, if the current review results in reforms 
such as those under consideration, notably the extension of section 117 to cases of intestacy, 
important policy decisions in this regard will have to be made. Continuing with the current 
distinction between spouses on testacy and, in particular, extending it to situations of intestacy, has 
clear potential to generate controversy, especially given the increasingly fluid nature of family 
structures in Irish society.23 
On one hand, on intestacy, such a distinction may be considered justifiable on the basis of ‘conduit 
theory’. First coined by Waggoner, ‘conduit theory’ proposes that a surviving spouse who is a parent 
of the deceased’s children, may be viewed as a ‘conduit’ or medium through which a deceased’s 
estate may ultimately be devolved to the children of the relationship.24 Generous provision to such a 
spouse is therefore justified on intestacy as the child’s interest in the estate is really only deferred or 
postponed, in many cases, rather than exhausted. However, where the deceased has children from a 
previous relationship, this theory is considered to be somewhat more uncertain. The belief that 
stepparents are less likely to leave anything to their stepchildren in their will appears well-
entrenched.25 Moreover, depending on how the applicable legislation is framed, stepchildren may 
possess little, if any, entitlement to share in the intestate estate of a stepparent or enjoy little ability 
to seek family provision from their testate estate.26 Conscious of this apparent threat to the interests 
                                                          
22
 This would be in keeping with the current approach adopted on partial testacy.  
23
 According to the Central Statistics Office, there were 2,442 marriages involving at least one divorced person 
in 2015 in Ireland, including 486 marriages where both parties were divorced, see  
http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/mcp/marriagesandcivilpartnerships2015/ [Accessed 24 
November 2016]. 
24
 L Waggoner, “The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code” 
(1990-1991) 76 Iowa Law Review 223.  
25
 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: intestacy (Report No 116–2007) 
para 3.48 observed: ‘The basic problem is that the children would have expected, in the normal course of 
events, to receive something of the estate upon the death of the surviving spouse, so long as the surviving 
spouse was their parent. Such an expectation is unlikely to be fulfilled on the death of the surviving spouse 
who is only a step-parent. This is because people are less likely to leave anything in their wills to stepchildren…’ 
(emphasis added). Douglas et al, ‘Enduring Love? Attitudes to Family and Inheritance Law in England and 
Wales’ (2011) 38(2) Law and Society 245, 259 also noted, on the basis of the qualitative interviews undertaken 
as part of their research, a sense that ‘a second spouse would not necessarily have the interests of the 
deceased’s children sufficiently at heart and so could not be trusted to provide for them’ (emphasis added). 
See also O’Sullivan, ‘Distribution of intestate estates in non-traditional families: A way forward?’ (2017) 
Common Law World Review (forthcoming).  
26
 In Ireland, for example, a stepchild may not make an application under section 117 against a stepparent’s 
estate. Moreover, where a stepparent dies intestate, a stepchild will not be considered ‘issue’ within the 
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of children from a former relationship, a distinction between the entitlements of different categories 
of surviving spouses on intestacy is now applied in a number of common law jurisdictions including 
in British Columbia, Canada,27 in a number of US states28 and in New South Wales, Australia.29 In 
these jurisdictions, where a deceased is survived by children from a former relationship, the 
entitlement of a surviving spouse is significantly reduced. 
Yet, whether such differential treatment in the provision afforded to different categories of surviving 
spouses on intestacy on the basis of parentage is sustainable in an Irish context is debateable. To the 
contrary, it is strongly arguable that if section 117 is extended to intestacy, the full intestate 
entitlement of a surviving spouse should be guaranteed and considered untouchable – even in 
circumstances where they were not the parent of an applicant child. Limiting the claim of a 
deceased’s children from a former relationship in this way would appear in line with findings of 
American research which indicated: 
‘A statute that provides a second or subsequent spouse with 60 to 70 percent of the 
deceased’s estate with the residue being shared equally by the decedent’s children or their 
issue would mirror most intestate decedent’s preferences and best accommodate societal 
needs.’30 
While it is by no means certain that comparable findings would be reported in Ireland vis-à-vis 
‘intestate decedent’s preferences’ in the context of a non-nuclear family, the need to have regard to 
demographic changes and to ensure the financial protection of all surviving spouses, whether a 
parent of an applicant child or otherwise, ought arguably to ensure minimum spousal provision of 
two-thirds of an intestate estate is retained.31 Moreover, the fractional share approach in Ireland 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
meaning of section 67 and will thus not benefit from the distribution of the estate. Similar limitations limit the 
claim of stepchildren in a stepparent’s estate in many other jurisdictions. 
27
 Section 21(3) of the Wills, Estate and Succession Act 2009 provides that where a deceased dies leaving a 
surviving spouse and descendants who are also the descendants of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse 
is entitled to the first $300,000 and one half of the remainder of the estate. The descendants share in the 
other half of the remainder. Where the deceased dies leaving a surviving spouse and descendants, including 
those from a former relationship, however, section 21(4) provides the preferential share of the spouse is 
reduced to $150,000. 
28
 The Uniform Probate Code is adopted, at least in part, by 18 states in the United States of America, see 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (2014) Amendments to Uniform Probate Code, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/2014_UPC_Final_apr23.pdf (accessed 02 March 
2016).  Where the deceased has children from a previous relationship the surviving spouse receives $150,000 
and a half-share in the balance of the estate. The remaining half-share of the balance is divided between the 
deceased’s children. Where the deceased has children which are all common descendants of the deceased and 
the surviving spouse, but the surviving spouse also has children from another relationship, the surviving 
spouse receives $225,000 and a half share in the balance of the estate. The remaining half-share of the 
balance is divided between the deceased’s children. Where the deceased had no children or all the children 
were also the children of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to the entire estate. See section 
2-102 of the UPC, as revised in 2008.  
29
 See the Succession Act 2006 and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: 
intestacy (Report No.116-2007) discussed below. 
30
 Mary L. Fellows, Rita J. Simon and William Rau, ‘Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and 
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States’ (1978) 3(2) Am Bar Found Res J 319, 367. 
31
 The provision of a mere one-third of an intestate estate in favour of a spouse would seem wholly 
insufficient. The need to ensure the financial position of surviving spouses in England and Wales, for instance, 
appears to have been a major factor in the Law Commission’s refusal to recommend any reform better 
facilitating a deceased’s children from a former relationship sharing in the intestate estate of their deceased 
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differs quite significantly from the statutory legacy regimes applied in most of the common law 
world where such distinctions are becoming increasingly popular. A major consideration in 
introducing a dual scheme of provision on the basis of parentage in jurisdictions applying a statutory 
legacy regime is the desire to ensure children from a former relationship get to share something 
from their deceased parent’s estate – an outcome which is no means guaranteed under such 
regimes in light of the front-loading of provision in favour of the surviving spouse. These difficulties 
do not arise under the fractional share approach adopted in Ireland. All children receive a share in 
the intestate estate of a deceased parent irrespective of size. The need for drawing such a distinction 
between different categories of spouses on intestacy in this jurisdiction would thus seem less 
pressing. 
Whether the current distinction in the protection afforded to the entitlements of different 
categories of surviving spouses in the context of testacy ought to be retained is equally liable to elicit 
polarised views. It may reasonably be argued that where a testator has exercised their testamentary 
freedom to make gifts or bequests to a surviving spouse, in excess of their legal right share, this 
ought to be respected, irrespective of whether the surviving spouse is the parent of all the 
deceased’s children or not. Yet, viewed in a different light, affording such freedom to a parent in a 
non-nuclear family context might appear to go too far. It would, for example, appear potentially 
unfair that a child from a former relationship could not make an application for ‘proper provision’ 
from a deceased parent’s testate estate where a testator had left their entire estate to the surviving 
spouse, the child’s stepparent. In such a scenario, in light of the different dynamics liable to be at 
play32 and given the fact that a child does not possess an automatic entitlement to a share of the 
testate estate of a deceased parent, it is strongly arguable that scope is required to reduce the 
provision made under a will to such surviving spouses in excess of their legal right share.33  
 Part III: The need to extend the family provision scheme to surviving spouses  
In considering the possible extension of section 117 to situations of intestacy, the Commission 
referred to its previous endorsement of such reform as formerly carried in its 1989 Report on Land 
Law and Conveyancing Law. Notwithstanding the then Minister of Justice’s concerns that the 
extension ‘would increase the prospects of estates being whittled away on legal costs’, the benefits 
of the reform, in the eyes of the Commission, outweighed the negatives.34 In its 1989 Report, the 
Commission noted its view that the policy underlying section 117 was that ‘persons with the means 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
parent, see Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy and family provision claims on death, Law Com. 
No.331, HC Paper No.1674 (The Stationary Office, 2011). Although it, arguably, is going too far in its protection 
of surviving spouses, see O’Sullivan, ‘Distribution of intestate estates in non-traditional families: A way 
forward?’ (2017) Common Law World Review (forthcoming). 
32
 Objectively, the likelihood of a stepchild benefiting from a stepparent’s estate is smaller, see above. 
33
 Note, however, the need to have clear parameters on the exercise of section 117 would be of the utmost 
importance in ensuring an appropriate balance was struck between the interests of the applicant child and 
surviving spouse. Moreover, although it may be argued that scope to reduce the entitlement of surviving 
spouses is also required in a nuclear family scenario, the increased vulnerability of a deceased’s child from a 
previous relationship, as noted above, would seem to heighten the risk to their interests in this context and  
more strongly support the need for such protection.  
34
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Issues Paper: Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP9-2016) pp 
50-51 referring to the Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (1) 
General Proposals (LRC 30-1989).  
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to do so should make proper provision for their dependants.’35 On this basis, it argued that both 
‘justice and logic’ required that discretionary family provision should be available to applicant 
children whether the person concerned died testate or intestate.36 The Commission concluded  
‘…it should be remembered that the manner in which an intestate’s estate is shared among 
the next-of-kin cannot be regarded as more than a rough and ready attempt to do justice 
between them’.37  
Ultimately, it noted that the lack of discretionary family provision legislation on intestacy gave rise to 
a ‘real possibility of serious injustice’ being suffered by children of an intestate.38 
It is submitted that any scheme premised on the provision of pre-defined fractional shares with no 
general provision for the exercise of judicial discretion may rightly be characterised as ‘rough and 
ready’ and liable to give rise to ‘serious injustice’. However, while the Commission’s focus was 
understandably on the ‘injustice’ this might cause to children, it is equally clear that these same 
weaknesses of the fractional share approach adopted also undermine the protection afforded to 
surviving spouses on both testacy and intestacy. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the vulnerability that 
the absence of a general provision facilitating discretionary family provision claims by surviving 
spouses in Ireland can produce. The extent to which the fractional share approach meets the needs 
of surviving spouses is essentially fortuitous, yet unless they fit into the very narrow criteria of 
section 56(10), they have no ability to seek further provision from a deceased spouse’s estate.39   
Relative to other common law jurisdictions, the level of protection afforded to the interests of 
surviving spouses in Ireland shows some striking shortcomings. Admittedly, the Succession Act 
provides comparatively strong protection against spousal disinheritance by ensuring an automatic 
minimum level of provision for surviving spouses. However, the lack of a floor of support in Ireland, 
particularly on intestacy, further compounded by the absence of family provision legislation for 
surviving spouses, has the capacity to leave such spouses in a very vulnerable financial position.40 In 
England and Wales, where a deceased dies intestate leaving a surviving spouse and issue, the spouse 
receives all personal chattels, a statutory legacy of the first £250,000 of the estate and one-half of 
the remainder absolutely.41 Latest figures show that an incredible 90% of intestate estates are worth 
                                                          
35
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (1) General Proposals (LRC 
30-1989) 24. 
36
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (1) General Proposals (LRC 
30-1989) 24. 
37
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (1) General Proposals (LRC 
30-1989) 24. 
38
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (1) General Proposals (LRC 
30-1989) 24. 
39
 See also Brian E. Spierin, The Succession Act 1965 And Related Legislation: A Commentary (4th
 
edn 
Butterworths 2011) 203.  
40
 See O’Sullivan, ‘’Til Death do us Part’: Surviving Spouses, Civil Partners & Provision on Intestacy in Ireland’ 
(2016) 38(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 118; ‘Spousal Disinheritance Protections under Irish Law: 
A proposal for reform’ (2012) Common Law World Review 41(3), 246. See also Burns, ‘Intestacy Law in 
Australia, England and Singapore-Another aid to social sustainability in an ageing population’ (2012) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 366 who considered such weaknesses in the comparable Singaporean regime.  
41
 See section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended by section 71 of the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 and section 1 of the Inheritance and Trustee’s Powers Act 201.  Where there are no issue, the 
9 | P a g e  
 
less than this statutory legacy with the surviving spouse taking the entire intestate estate in an 
overwhelming majority of cases.42 Even where spouses do not take the entire estate under the rules 
of intestacy, they may seek further provision at the discretion of the court pursuant to the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975.43 In New South Wales, Australia, where 
the deceased is survived by a spouse and issue, the surviving spouse takes the entire intestate estate 
unless there were issue from a former relationship. In the latter situation, however, the outcome 
would still, in the majority of cases, ensure ‘all to spouse’ with the statutory legacy set at $350,000.44 
High statutory legacies in favour of surviving spouses are also applied in Scotland pursuant to the 
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 as amended by the Civil Partnership Act 200445 as well as in many 
other common law jurisdictions.46  
Despite the lack of attention afforded to the issue in Ireland, there is a clear trend emerging across 
the common law world towards the further intensification of the provision afforded to surviving 
spouses on intestacy, particularly in a nuclear family scenario. There are a number of factors which 
explain why a surviving spouse is increasingly viewed as ‘a significant and even imperative heir to the 
intestate estate’.47 As Burns outlines: 
‘Spousal relationships are companionate so that both spouses assume reciprocal obligations 
of care and maintenance and intestate succession ought to reflect such obligations. 
Generally, the surviving spouse has contributed to the assets used commonly by the couple, 
so the surviving spouse deserves to inherit a significant portion of the estate. Moreover, it is 
likely that the surviving spouse will need to rely on the intestate’s assets because the 
surviving spouse may be economically vulnerable.’48 
The potential economic vulnerability of surviving spouses appears to be an ever more important 
driving factor. In recommending reform of its intestacy regime, the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission recently noted the significance of giving ‘more recognition to the needs of the surviving 
spouse or partner’.49 Likewise, having noted its increasingly ageing population, Cooke noted in 
relation to England and Wales: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
surviving spouse or civil partner now takes the entire estate, see section 1 of the Inheritance and Trustees' 
Powers Act 2014. 
42
 Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy and family provision claims on death (Law Com. No.331-
2011) para.2.6.  
43
 In fact, there appears to be considerable support within the Law Commission for going even further and 
giving ‘all to spouse’ even if there are children. In 1989, the Law Commission voiced their support for proposals 
advocating ‘all to spouse’. More recently, in 2011, the Commission again supported the further intensification 
of the rights of spouses, see Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy and family provision claims on 
death (Law Com No 331–2011) as noted above. 
44
 See Chapter 4 of the Succession Act 2006. For more see, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Uniform succession laws: intestacy (Report No.116-2007). See also Fiona Burns, ‘The Changing Patterns of 
Total Intestacy Distribution’ (2013) 36(2) UNSW L J 470. 
45
 In light of the most recent increases, the combined value of prior rights afforded to surviving spouses or civil 
partners where the deceased is also survived by issue equates to £502,050. 
46
 See above 
47
 Burns, ‘The Changing Patterns of Total Intestacy Distribution’ (2013) 36(2) UNSW Law Journal 470, 509 
48
 Burns, ‘The Changing Patterns of Total Intestacy Distribution’ (2013) 36(2) UNSW Law Journal 470, 509 
49
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: intestacy (Report No.116-2007) 
para.1.37.  
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‘There are good reasons for keeping resources with the older generation rather than passing 
it downwards, in order to provide the older generation with what they need for their care in 
later life. Typically a parent dies in old age when their children are middle-aged and well 
established in life; it may well be that the surviving spouse's needs are far more pressing 
than those of the younger generation.’50 
Across the board, it seems recognition of these demographic shifts in the Western World have 
informed the ‘inexorable trajectory of reforms in favour of the spouse’.51 Unfortunately, although 
such demographic changes were also noted by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland – and 
notwithstanding that in all but the largest intestate estates surviving spouses in Ireland do worse 
(potentially significantly worse the smaller the estate) than their counterparts in many other 
common law jurisdictions – no meaningful reform to better provide for surviving spouses has been 
considered in the jurisdiction. Although robust reform of the provision afforded to surviving spouses 
in Ireland on both testacy and intestacy has been proposed and could be implemented to offset the 
weaknesses of the regime,52 such reform seems unlikely to be undertaken in the foreseeable future. 
Viewed in this context, it is strongly arguable that at a minimum the introduction of family provision 
legislation for surviving spouses ought to be introduced.53 
Conclusion  
It goes without question that the current review of section 117 is to be welcomed. However, as this 
paper has shown, the importance of considering the implications for surviving spouses of any law 
reform in this area must be borne in mind as the review proceeds. In this regard, as highlighted 
above, important policy choices will have to be made in determining how to deal with different 
                                                          
50
 Cooke, ‘Wives, Widows and Wicked Step-Mothers: A Brief Examination of Spousal Entitlement on Intestacy’ 
21 Child and Family Law Quarterly 423, 433. 
51 Burns, ‘The Changing Patterns of Total Intestacy Distribution’ (2013) 36(2) UNSW Law Journal 470, 486. In 
British Columbia, Canada, the British Columbia Law Institute, Wills, Estates and Succession: A Modern Legal 
Framework (BCLI Report No 45–2006) xvii has also recognised the paramount position of the surviving spouse, 
noting ‘the need to secure the position of a surviving spouse who may well be advanced in years at the time of 
the intestate’s death’. In establishing the new preferential share, reference was made at 14 to typical estate 
values in British Columbia and to ‘contemporary social standards that favour a generous provision of an estate 
for the surviving spouse’ (emphasis added). 
Similarly, as the Australian National Committee on Uniform Succession Laws explained in framing its 2007 
Uniform Succession Laws (2007) para.1.37: ‘There is no doubt that needs of the surviving spouse … have 
become more and more important over time. This is partly a result of changing demographics which make 
spouses … more reliant on the intestate’s estate in their later years and the children less reliant. This report 
therefore considers the surviving spouse … as the primary concern of distribution on intestacy. This reflects a 
trend in most comparable jurisdictions towards giving more recognition to the needs of the surviving spouse 
...’ 
52
 See O’Sullivan, ‘’Til Death do us Part’: Surviving Spouses, Civil Partners & Provision on Intestacy in Ireland’ 
(2016) 38(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 118 and O’Sullivan ‘Spousal Disinheritance Protections 
under Irish Law: A proposal for reform’ (2012) Common Law World Review 41(3), 246. 
53
 Discretionary provision is not the optimum solution in overcoming the vulnerability of surviving spouses in 
Ireland, see O’Sullivan, ‘’Til Death do us Part’: Surviving Spouses, Civil Partners & Provision on Intestacy in 
Ireland’ (2016) 38(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 118. Much more comprehensive reform could 
be undertaken to support those most in need. However, the introduction of discretionary family provision 
legislation for spouses would at least go some way towards offsetting a major weakness of the current 
scheme.  
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categories of surviving spouses, particularly if the Commission ultimately recommends reform 
extending section 117 to cases of intestacy. 
While the Issues Paper understandably focused on the family provision regime applied pursuant to 
section 117 from the perspective of applicant children, it is submitted the current review of the 
regime also presents an important opportunity to re-consider the need to extend family provision 
legislation to surviving spouses. As noted, in considering the extension of section 117 to intestacy, 
the Commission implicitly recognised the shortcomings of a fractional share regime. Precisely the 
same arguments may be made to support, at a minimum, the extension of a discretionary family 
provision scheme to surviving spouses in Ireland. Although surviving spouses do enjoy automatic 
entitlements to a deceased’s estate whether testate or intestate, there is no guarantee that such 
provision will ensure their financial protection. Nevertheless, as currently framed, such spouses do 
not possess any general entitlement to seek extra provision in these circumstances. This lacuna in 
the Succession Act, could, it would appear, be easily remedied. 
Responding to demographic shifts and an ever-growing awareness of the needs of surviving spouses, 
a number of key common law jurisdictions have revised their succession law regimes and 
dramatically augmented the entitlements of such spouses.54 As the Law Reform Commission 
considers its next step in this current review of the family provision regime applied under section 
117, it is to be hoped that the need to ensure the continued protection of vulnerable surviving 
spouses in Ireland will be prioritised in any recommendations advanced.  
                                                          
54
 See above.  
